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ABSTRACT: The use of positive and negative reasons in inference and deci-
sion aiding is a recurrent issue of investigation as far as the type of formal language
to use within a DSS is concerned. A language enabling to explicitly take into ac-
count such reasons is Belnap’s logic and the four valued logics derived from it. In
this paper, we explore the interpretation of a continuous extension of a four valued
logic as a necessity degree (in possibility theory). It turns out that, in order to take
full advantage of the four values, we have to consider “sub-normalised” necessity
measures. Under such a hypothesis four-valued logics become the natural logical
frame for such an approach.
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11 Introduction
The design and implementation of Decision Support Systems requires, besides ap-
propriatecomputerinterfaces, theuseofformallanguagesinwhichtheinformation
about decision problems and preferences of the decision makers and of the users
have to be coded. A language regularly used (some times implicitly) for such a
purpose is classic logic. For instance preference statements of the type “x is better
than y” become binary predicates to apply in a universe of discourse represented
by the set of potential actions a decision maker could undertake. Classic logic is
sufﬁciently powerful to allow elegant and concise representations besides ﬁtting
the mathematical dimension of most of the decision and evaluation models used
within Decision Support Systems [see 6, 10]
On the other hand classic logic is not always suitable to formalise real life
problem situations since it is unable to handle incomplete and/or inconsistent in-
formation. In decision aiding such situations are regular and indeed classic logic
has often been criticised as a language used for decision support models formula-
tion [see 16, 17, 27, 32, 39]. Both in decision theory and in logic, a recurrent idea
is to separate positive and negative reasons supporting a decision and/or a logical
inference [for some early contributions the reader can see 7, 8, 15, 29, 30]. Under
such a perspective we study the possibility to extend a four valued logic [see 37]
in situations where it is possible to make continuous valuations on the presence of
truth.
The best known formal language explicitly designed to take into account posi-
tive and negative reasons for inference purposes is Belnap’s four valued logic. The
four values (t, f, k, u) introduced by Belnap have a clear epistemic nature. Given a
proposition ®, four situations are possible:
- true (t): there is evidence that ® holds (presence of positive reasons) and there is
no evidence that ® does not hold (absence of negative reasons);
- false (f): there is no evidence that ® holds (absence of positive reasons) and there
is evidence that ® does not hold (presence of negative reasons);
- contradictory (k): there is evidence that ® holds (presence of positive reasons)
and there is evidence that ® does not hold (presence of negative reasons);
- unknown (u): there is no evidence that ® holds (absence of positive reasons) and
there is no evidence that ® does not hold (absence of negative reasons).
However, the sources of uncertainty are not limited to pure unknown and/or
contradictory situations. The evidence “for” or “against” a certain sentence might
not be necessarily of a crisp nature. In this case, we can consider continuous valua-
tion of “positive” and “negative reasons” [see 38]. This continuous extension may
help us to deal with uncertainty due to doubts about the validity of the knowledge;
imprecision due to the vagueness of the natural language terms; incompleteness
2due to the absence of information; apparent inconsistency due to contradictory
statements. Such situations are all the more relevant in decision aiding and prefer-
ence modelling.
Indeed Belnap’s logic has already been studied and extended [in 14, 36, 39]
as a language for preference modelling purposes (the DDT logic). Such a (ﬁrst
order) language allows to take explicitly into account crisp positive and negative
reasons for which a preference statement of the type “x is better than y” holds, thus
allowing the construction of more ﬂexible preference structures [see 40]. In this
paper, besides presenting the DDT logic [37] we study the continuous extension
of Belnap’s logic suggested in [28]. Of course Belnap’s logic is not the only way
to consider paraconsistency [see 12, 31]. However, it has the simplest semantics
allowing to create easily extensions for several different purposes. The reader can
see other types of extensions in the work of Arieli [see 2, 3, 4, 5].
The aim of the paper is to verify whether it is possible to associate to the DDT
logicanuncertaintydistribution, possiblyofthepossibility/necessitytypeandifso,
under which conditions. Section 2, introduces the basic concepts of the four-valued
logic and its continuous extension through the concept of positive and negative
membership. Two examples of their use in decision aiding are also present in
this section. In Section 3, we try to establish a ﬁrst relation between four-valued
logic and possibility theory. Some related problems are discussed. In Section 4,
we suggest the use of “sub-normalised” necessity distributions and we show why
four-valued logic can be considered a language to which associate such a type of
uncertainty distributions.
2 Four-valued logic and its continuous extension
2.1 Syntax
Belnap’soriginalproposition[see7, 8]aimedtocapturesituationswherehesitation
in establishing the truth of a sentence could be associated either to ignorance (poor
information) or to contradiction (excess of information). In order to distinguish
these two types of uncertainty, he suggested the use of four values forming a bi-
lattice (see ﬁgure 1). Intuitively, the four values are partially ordered on the basis of
two relations: ”more truth” relation and ”more information” relation. It is easy to
remark that u and k are incomparable on the ﬁrst dimension of the bilattice while t
and f are incomparable on the second one. It has been shown that such a bi-lattice
is the smallest nontrivial interlaced bi-lattice [see 21, 24].
DDT logic [for details see 37] extended Belnap’s logic in a ﬁrst order language
endowed with a weak negation (6»). DDT is a boolean algebra. This logic allows
3¡
¡
¡
¡
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
¡
¡
¡
¡
-
6
u
information
truth
f
t
k
Figure 1: The Bilattice suggested by Belnap
® 6» ® :® » ®
t k f f
k t k u
u f u k
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Table 1: The truth tables of the negations and the complement
a distinction between the strong negation (:) and the complementation (») (see
table 1). It is easy to check that » ® ´ : 6» : 6» ®. One can remark that
strong negation swaps positive and negative reasons, complementation reverses
the existence of negative and positive reasons while weak negation reverses only
the existence of negative reasons.
The truth values of some basic binary operators are introduced in table 2 where
the conjunction (resp. disjunction) is constructed as the lower bound (resp. upper
bound) of the truth dimension.
One can remark that the implication is deﬁned as follows:
® ! ¯ ´» ® _ ¯
This is a strong implication of the type used in classic logic. The purpose of
such an operator is to be a representation of inclusion. However, other weaker
implications can be deﬁned within this language.
Besides ordinary four valued sentences, in DDT it is possible to formulate bi-
valued sentences such as:
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Table 2: The truth tables of conjunction, disjunction and implication
² ¢® (there is presence of truth in ®);
² ¢:® (there is presence of truth in :®);
² T® (® is true);
² K® (® is contradictory);
² U® (® is unknown);
² F® (® is false);
through the following formulas:
- ¢® ´ (® ^ : » ®) _ (6» ® ^ 6» :®)
- T® ´ ® ^ : » ®
It is easy to see that:
- ¢® ´ T(®) _ K(®)
- T® ´ ¢® ^ :¢:®.
Example 2.1 Why the above is a relevant language in decision aiding problems?
Let us take the example of a Parliament which is preparing to vote for a new pro-
posal (®) concerning an ethical issue. Members of the Parliament (MPs) can vote
“for” or “against” this proposal or can “not vote”.
Suppose that the Parliament has the following rule for adopting laws concern-
ing ethics: a “strong” majority has to vote “for” (more than 51%) and no more
than 1/3 can vote “against” (the last one is used in order to defend minorities)1.
This kind of voting can be captured by the four valued logic as in the following:
¢® = 1 iff
V (®)
N ¸ 0:51
¢:® = 1 iff
V (:®)
N ¸ 0:33
1the reader can see the Nice Treaty establishing the decision rules of the enlarged European Union
for more complicated similar examples
5Case V (®) V (:®) ¢® ¢:® Value
1 75 20 1 0 True
2 48 40 0 1 False
3 60 40 1 1 Contradictory
4 41 25 0 0 unknown
Table 3: The truth table of example 1
where
N: number of MPs (let’s suppose the parliament having 100 Mps)
V (®): number of MPs voting for ®,
V (:®): number of MPs voting against ®
Four different cases are presented in table 3. In the ﬁrst two cases there is no
hesitation since in the ﬁrst one the bill is clearly accepted, while in the second it
is clearly rejected. In the third case, the majority of MPs are for the acceptance of
the proposal but at the same time the number of MPs against ® is remarkable too;
the proposition will not be accepted, but it is clear that we are facing a conﬂict, a
contradictory case. Finally, in the fourth case, the votes for and against ® are in-
sufﬁcient to make a decision which is expressed here with the unknown value. From
a decision aiding point of view, it is clear that the recommendation of an analyst
towards a decision maker facing any of the above situations will be different. In
the third case it is necessary to work towards the opposants (perhaps negotiating
in order to meet some of their claims), while in the fourth case is necessary to con-
vince the “non voters” (perhaps strengthening the contents of the law). The reader
can see further literature on similar voting schemes in [19].
Until this point we gave a brief presentation of DDT in terms of a propositional
language. However, what we really need is a ﬁrst order language (which DDT
indeed is). We therefore need to go more in details with the relevant semantics for
this purpose.
2.2 Semantics
The introduced logic deals with uncertainty. A set A may be deﬁned, but the mem-
bership of an object a to the set may not be certain either because the information
is not sufﬁcient or because the information is contradictory.
In order to distinguish these two principal sources of uncertainty, the knowl-
edge about the “membership” of a to A and the “non-membership” of a to A are
6evaluated independently since they are not necessarily complementary. From this
point of view, from a given knowledge, we have two possible entailments, one pos-
itive, about membership and one negative, about non-membership. Therefore, any
predicate is deﬁned by two sets, its positive and its negative extension in the uni-
verse of discourse. Since the negative extension does not necessarily correspond
to the complement of the positive extension of the predicate we can expect that
the two extensions possibly overlap (due to the independent evaluation) and that
there exist parts of the universe of discourse that do not belong to either of the two
extensions. The four truth values capture these situations. More formally:
Consider a ﬁrst order language L. A similarity type ½ is a ﬁnite set of predicate
constants R, where each R has a ﬁnite arity nR · !. Every alphabet uniquely de-
termines a class of formulas. Relative to a given similarity type ½, R(x1;:::;xm)
is an atomic formula iff x1;:::;xm are individual variables, R 2 ½, and nR = m.
In this paper, formulas are denoted by the letters ®, ¯, °, ¢¢¢, possibly subscripted.
A structure or model M for similarity type ½ consists of a non-empty domain
jMj and, for each predicate symbol R 2 ½, an ordered pair RM = hRM+
;RM¡
i
of sets (not necessarily a partition) of nR-tuples from jMj. In fact, an individual
can be in the two sets or in neither of them. A variable assignment is a mapping
from the set of variables to objects in the domain of the model. Capital letters from
the beginning of the alphabet are used to represent variable assignments.
Example 2.2 Consider a language about preference statements using binary pred-
icates (the preference relations) and a universe of discourse being the cartesian
product of a set A of candidates with itself. Traditionally when we write p(x;y)
we read “x is preferred to y” and the semantics associated to this sentence is con-
structed taking pairs of candidates (instances of x and y, let’s say a and b) and
checking whether it is indeed the case that “a is preferred to b”. All instances, for
which it is the case, deﬁne the set of models of p(x;y). Automatically the com-
plement of this set with respect to the universe of discourse is the set of models of
:p(x;y). The negation of a sentence coincides with its complement.
Let’s use the DDT language in the above example. There might be pairs of
instances of x and y (let’s say a and b) for which we have information that “a is
preferred to b”. There might also be other instances of x and y (let’s say c and d)
for which we have information that “c is not preferred to d”. The set of all (a;b)
will deﬁne the set of models of p(x;y), while the set of all (c;d) will deﬁne the set
of models of not p(x;y). If we accept (that due to our imperfect knowledge) these
two sets do not form a partition of the universe of discourse, then it is easy to note
that there will be in the universe of discourse pairs for which we have both positive
and negative information and pairs for which we have none.
If we call the set of models of p(x;y) its positive extension, denoting it as P+
7and the set of models of not p(x;y) its negative extension, denoting it as P¡, in
the case of classic logic it is sufﬁcient to know one of the above to completely know
also the other (since one is the complement of the other). In the case of the DDT
logic (and other four valued logics) we need to explicitly know both of them. In
other terms the semantics of a sentence have to be deﬁned through two sets (the
positive and negative extension in the universe of discourse).
The truth deﬁnition for DDT is deﬁned via two semantic relations, j=t (true
entailment) and j=f (false entailment), by simultaneous recursion as in the follow-
ing deﬁnition (due to the structure introduced, the case of “not true entailment” 6j=t
does not coincide with the false entailment and the case of “not false entailment”
6j=f does not coincide with the true entailment). Each formula is univocally deﬁned
through its model which is however, a couple of sets, the “positive” and “negative”
extensions of the formula.
Deﬁnition 2.1
Let M be a model structure and A a variable assignment.
- Mj=t R(x1;:::;xn)[A] iff hA(x1);:::;A(xn)i 2 RM+
.
- Mj=f R(x1;:::;xn)[A] iff hA(x1);:::;A(xn)i 2 RM¡
.
- M6j=t R(x1;:::;xn)[A] iff hA(x1);:::;A(xn)i 2 jMj n RM+
.
- M6j=f R(x1;:::;xn)[A] iff hA(x1);:::;A(xn)i 2 jMj n RM¡
.
- Mj=t : ®[A] iff Mj=f ®[A].
- Mj=f : ®[A] iff Mj=t ®[A].
- M6j=t : ®[A] iff M6j=f ®[A].
- M6j=f : ®[A] iff M6j=t ®[A].
- Mj=t 6» ®[A] iff Mj=t ®[A].
- Mj=f 6» ®[A] iff M6j=f ®[A].
- M6j=t 6» ®[A] iff M6j=t ®[A].
- M6j=f 6» ®[A] iff Mj=f ®[A].
- Mj=t 8x®[A] iff Mj=t ®[A0] for all A0 differing with A at most at x.
- M6j=t 8x®[A] iff M6j=t ®[A0] for all A0 differing with A at most at x.
- Mj=f 8x®[A] iff Mj=t ®[A0] for an A0 differing with A at most at x.
- M6j=f 8x®[A] iff M6j=t ®[A0] for an A0 differing with A at most at x.
It is now possible to introduce an evaluation function v(®) mapping L in to the set
of truth values ft;k;u;fg as follows:
- v(®) = t iff Mj=t ®[A] and M6j=f ®[A]
- v(®) = k iff Mj=t ®[A] and Mj=f ®[A]
- v(®) = u iff M6j=t ®[A] and M6j=f ®[A]
- v(®) = f iff M6j=t ®[A] and Mj=f ®[A]
8Given any two subsets of formula ® and ¯, we can now extend deﬁnition 2.1 as
follows:
- ®j=t ¯ iff, for all variable assignments, if Mj=t ®[A] then Mj=t ¯[A]
- ®j=f ¯ iff, exists a variable assignment for which, Mj=f ¯[A] and M6j=f ®[A]
- ®6j=t ¯ iff, exists a variable assignment for which, Mj=t ®[A] and M6j=t ¯[A]
- ®6j=f ¯ iff, for all variable assignments, if Mj=f ¯[A] then Mj=f ®[A]
We get:
Proposition 2.1 Given a non empty domain jMj and two sets of formula ® and ¯
®j=t ¯ iff AM+
µ BM+
®j=f ¯ iff BM¡
6µ AM¡
®6j=t ¯ iff AM+
6µ BM+
®6j=f ¯ iff BM¡
µ AM¡
Proof. Straightforwardapplyingdeﬁnition2.1.
Finally we can introduce the concept of strong consequence:
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Strong Consequence.)
A formula ® is true in a model M iff Mj=t ®[A] and M6j=f ®[A] for all variable
assignments A and we write Mj ´®[A]. A formula ® is satisﬁable iff ® is true in a
model M for some M. A set of formulas ¡ is said to has as strong consequence or
to strongly entail a formula ® (written ¡j ´®) when for all models M and variable
assignments A, if Mj ´¯i[A], for all ¯i 2 ¡, then Mj ´®[A].
Translating the above in set notation we get the following: consider a set A and
a predicate S of ﬁnite arity n. Such a universe is partitioned into four subsets:
St = S+\ s S¡ Sk = S+ \ S¡ (1)
Su =s S+\ s S¡ Sf =s S+ \ S¡ (2)
where s S+ (s S¡) is the complement of S+ (S¡) and St, Sk, Su, Sf, represent
the true, the contradictory, the unknown and the false extensions of the predicate S
within the universe An. Hence (:S)+;(:S)¡;(» S)+and(» S)¡ are deﬁned as
follows:
(:S)+ = S¡ (:S)¡ = (S+)
(» S)+ =» (S+) (» S)¡ =» (S¡)
Obviously the following hold:
St [ Sk = S+ Sf [ Sk = S¡ (3)
St [ Su =s S¡ Sf [ Su =s S+ (4)
9St = (:S)f = (s S)f
Sk = (:S)k = (s S)u
Su = (:S)u = (s S)k
Sf = (:S)t = (s S)t
St [ Sk [ Su [ Sf = An
St \ Sk = St \ Su = ;
St \ Sf = Sf \ Sk = Sf \ Su = Sk \ Su = ;
2.3 Continuous Extension
For the continuous extension of the previously introduced four valued logic, S+
and S¡ can be considered as fuzzy subsets and two membership functions can be
introduced (for a ﬁxed domain M):
¹S+ : M ! [0;1] ¹S¡ : M ! [0;1]
Such functions can be considered for instance as degrees representing to what ex-
tent we believe in S(x) and in non S(x) respectively (X representing a universe of
discourse). Such an interpretation can be represented by the following notation:
¹S+(®) =B(®) ¹S¡(®) =B(:®)
We then have to deﬁne the fuzzy subsets St, Sk, Su, Sf. The membership
functions of such subsets can be respectively denoted by:
¹St(®) = t(®) ¹Sk(®) = k(®)
¹Su(®) = u(®) ¹Sf(®) = f(®)
2.3.1 Basic operators on B(®)
We have to make explicit the intersection, the union and the complementation to
fuzzy subsets of X in order to establish relations between the positive and nega-
tive reasons (B(®);B(:®)) and the four fuzzy membership functions. To deﬁne
these operators, we introduce a De Morgan triple (N;T;V ) where N is a strict
negation on [0, 1], T a continuous t-norm and V is a continuous co-norm such that
V (x;y) = N(T(N(x);N(y))). Fuzzyﬁng equations 1, 2 and 3 we obtain:
B(®) = V (t(®);k(®)) B(:®) = V (N(t(®));k(®))
t(®) = T(B(®);N(B(:®))) u(®) = T(N(B(®));N(B(:®)))
k(®) = T(B(®);B(:®)) f(®) = T(N(B(®));B(:®))
10As a consequence we should get:
8®; B(®) = V (T(B(®);N(B(:®)));T(B(®);B(:®)))
Supposing that B(®) = x and B(:®) = y, the last equation can be written as
follows:
8x;y 2 [0;1]; x = V (T(x;N(y));T(x;y))
Unfortunately, there is generally no De Morgan triple satisfying such an equation
(see [1]). Thus, we have to investigate partial solutions relaxing some constraints
of the problem. The idea is to use different t-norms for different quantities [see
also 22]. Following [28] the four truth values can be deﬁned through B(®) and
B(:®) as follows:
t(®) =T1(B(®);N(B(:®))) (5)
k(®) =T2(B(®);(B(:®))) (6)
u(®) =T3(N(B(®));N(B(:®))) (7)
f(®) =T4(N(B(®));(B(:®))) (8)
where B(®) + N(B(®)) = 1 and T1;T2;T3;T4 are continuous t-norms. The
following step is to decide which t-norms will be used for T1;T2;T3;T4. For this
purpose, we propose a number of conditions:
² the deﬁnition of fuzzy partition must be fulﬁlled:
8®; t(®) + k(®) + u(®) + f(®) = 1 (9)
² the fuzzyﬁcation of the deﬁnitions of strong and weak negation and comple-
mentation presented in table 1 must be satisﬁed:
t(®) = f(:®) = f(s ®) = k( ®) (10)
k(®) = k(:®) = u(s ®) = t( ®) (11)
u(®) = u(:®) = k(s ®) = f( ®) (12)
f(®) = t(:®) = t(s ®) = u( ®) (13)
² the fuzzyﬁcation of equations 3 and 4 which represent relations between
positive and negative reasons and four values must be satisﬁed:
B(®) = V (t(®);k(®)) (14)
B(:®) = V (f(®);k(®)) (15)
11² the contradictory and unknown cases must be exclusive:
8®; minfu(®);k(®)g = 0 (16)
Proposition 2.2 hT1;T2;T3;T4;T;V;Ni is solution of equations 9-16 if and only
if the following conditions hold:
N =LNÁ T2 =T3 = LTÁ
V =LVÁ T1 =T4 = min
where (LN Á, LT Á, LV Á) is the Lukasiewicz triple [see 33].
Proof. See appendix A. Similar proofs can be also seen in [13, 41, 42].
ForthesakeofsimplicityweonlyinterpretherethecasewhereÁ(x) = x; 8x 2
[0;1]. We thus get
Corollary 2.1
t(®) =min(B(®);1 ¡ B(:®)) (17)
k(®) =max(B(®) + B(:®) ¡ 1;0) (18)
u(®) =max(1 ¡ B(®) ¡ B(:®);0) (19)
f(®) =min(1 ¡ B(®);B(:®)) (20)
Proof. Straightforward from equations 10 - 13 and proposition 2.2.
Corollary 2.2
B(®) = t(®) + k(®) (21)
B(:®) = f(®) + k(®) (22)
Proof. Applying proposition 2.2 on equation 14 we get:
B(®) = min(t(®) + k(®);1). Since
t(®) + k(®) + u(®) + f(®) = 1 we have that t(®) + k(®) · 1.
Therefore B(®) = t(®) + k(®). Similarly B(:®) = f(®) + k(®).
12We can now deﬁne some basic operators like negation, complementation, con-
junction, disjunction, implication and equivalence.
For this purpose we represent each formula ® by h®;(B(®);B(:®))i where
(B(®); B(:®)) is an ordered pair.
In order to deﬁne negations and complementation, we make use of their inter-
pretation in crisp case (see subsection 2.1) and we obtain:
h:®;(B(:®);B(®))i (23)
h ®;(B(®);1 ¡ B(:®))i (24)
hs ®;(1 ¡ B(®);1 ¡ B(:®))i (25)
The conjunction (resp. the disjunction) corresponds -as in crisp case- to the
lower bound (resp. the upper bound) of ® and ¯.
h® ^ ¯;(T1(B(®);B(¯));V1(B(:®);B(:¯)))i (26)
h® _ ¯;(V2(B(®);B(¯));T2(B(:®);B(:¯)))i (27)
where Ti = min; Vi = max; i = 1;2.
Remark 2.1 We presented here deﬁnitions of operators in terms of belief degrees
(B(®);B(:®)). The same deﬁnitions are given in terms of four values in [28].
Let’s remark that equations 14-15 make the passage from the one to the other easy
and provide equivalent deﬁnitions. In order to give an example, we show how to
compute k(® ^ ¯):
k(® ^ ¯) = max(B(® ^ ¯) + B(:(® ^ ¯)) ¡ 1;0)
k(® ^ ¯) = max[min(B(®);B(¯)) + max(B(:®);B(:¯)) ¡ 1;0]
k(® ^ ¯) = max[min(B(®);B(¯)) ¡ min(1 ¡ B(:®);1 ¡ B(:¯));0]
k(® ^ ¯) = max[min(B(®);B(¯)) ¡ min(1 ¡ B(:®);1 ¡ B(:¯));0]
k(® ^ ¯) = max[min(t(®) + k(®);t(¯) + k(¯)) ¡ min(t(®) + u(®);t(¯) + u(¯));0]
As far as implication is concerned a simple “fuzzyﬁcation” of the deﬁnition of
this operator in the DDT logic is not sufﬁcient. Remind that in DDT ® ! ¯ ´»
® _ ¯. Although DDT is based on a boolean algebra its continuous exten-
sion is not. DDT is established on a four elements set partially ordered through
the bi-lattice introduced in section 2.1. Its continuous extension is established on
a continuous space of inﬁnite values and therefore cannot be a boolean algebra.
13Therefore not all operators can be compositional. Since for the purpose of this pa-
per a detailed treatment of implication is not necessary, we are not going to analyse
further this issue.
We conclude this part by a generalisation of inference. One can deﬁne modus
ponens as in the following:
h®;(B(®);B(:®))i
h® ! ¯;(B(® ! ¯);B(:(® ! ¯)))i
h¯;(B(¯);B(:¯))i
where
B(¯) = min(B(®);B(® ! ¯))
B(:¯) = max(B(:®);B(:(® ! ¯)))
The interested reader can ﬁnd more details about operators in [28].
How can the continuous extension of the four valued logic be useful in deci-
sion aiding situations? The following example shows why distinguishing between
continuous positiveand negative reasons can be interesting in decision aiding. Typ-
ically it will allow to provide the client of the decision aiding process with more
operational recommendations.
Example 2.3 We choose again as an example the case of a Parliament which is
preparing to vote for a new proposal (®) concerning an ethical issue. Members
of the Parliament (MPs) can vote “for” or “against” this proposal or can “not
vote” but this time we are going to value the positive and negative reasons within
the [0;1] interval. Since a majority is needed, positive reasons become strictly
positive when at least 50% of the MPs vote “for” and become sure (equal to 1)
when at least 80% vote “for”. Negative reasons are used especially in order to
defend minority, that is why they become strictly positive when at least 15% vote
“against” and become sure (equal to 1) when at least 35% vote “against”. The
model is shown in ﬁgure 2.
In table 4 we show the simulation of a number of votes on a set of issues. How
can the decomposition in positive and negative reasons help a decision maker?
First of all it is easy to observe that (with that precise decision rule) negative
reasons grow faster than positive ones.
After a deep analysis of table 4 we can make the following comments: Cases 1
to 3 show that convincing two non voters to vote “for” will not improve acceptabil-
ity (t(a)), while convincing two opponents to not vote will do. Cases 4 and 5 show
how acceptability and opposition will change due to opinion shifts from “for” to
“against” when there are no “non voters”. Cases 6 to 10 show the appearance
14Case V (a) V (:a) B(a) B(:a) t(a) k(a) u(a) f(a)
1 75 20 0.83 0.25 0.75 0.08 0 0.17
2 75 18 0.83 0.15 0.83 0 0.02 0.15
3 77 20 0.9 0.25 0.75 0.15 0 0.1
4 82 18 1 0.15 0.85 0.15 0 0
5 78 22 0.93 0.35 0.65 0.28 0 0.07
6 58 26 0.26 0.55 0.26 0 0.19 0.55
7 58 17 0.26 0.1 0.26 0 0.64 0.1
8 58 35 0.26 1 0 0.26 0 0.74
9 68 26 0.6 0.55 0.45 0.15 0 0.4
10 68 17 0.6 0.1 0.6 0 0.3 0.1
Table 4: The truth table for example 2
of hesitation due to ignorance or conﬂict. The analysis of the positive and neg-
ative reasons helps in showing to a decision maker in what direction he should
concentrate his efforts in order to pursue his policy.
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Figure 2: B(®) and B(:®) for example 2
2.3.2 Other approaches about B(®)
The idea of having two separate measures for beliefs and disbeliefs is not new.
[34] talks about conﬁdence and difﬁdence measures as two separable components
of a belief function. However, in his approach these components are commensu-
rable (thus computable through a generalised Dempster rule). This is not the case
of B(®) and B(:®) which do not need such an assumption. [18] introduce the
concept of guaranteed possibility as a further uncertainty measure, different with
15respect to the usual possibility measures. These two distributions can be seen as
upper and lower approximations of a not well known possibility distribution. They
do not represent though independent positive and negative reasons concerning the
belief to a sentence. Nearest to our approach can be considered the Transferable
Belief Model [see 35] which allows measures of contradiction.
On the other hand our continuous extension of a four valued logic is not the
unique approach followed in the literature. [23] have also presented a different
extension within the context of preference modelling. The major difference be-
tween these two approaches is the fact that Fortemps and Słowi´ nski’s one does not
provide a fuzzy partition of the universe of discourse.
In their approach, positive an negative reasons are presented by two indepen-
dent necessity degrees, NT and NF which they call degrees of truthfulness and
falsity respectively. Using our notation h®;(NT(®);NF(®))i, we can mention that
NT (resp. NF) corresponds to our fuzzy membership function ¹S+ (resp. ¹S¡).
Their interpretation of negations, complementation, conjunction and disjunc-
tion is very similar to ours:
h:®;(NF(®);NT(®))i
h ®;(NT(®);1 ¡ NF(®))i
hs ®;(1 ¡ NT(®);1 ¡ NF(®))i
h® ^ ¯;(min(NT(®);NT(¯));max(NF(®);NF(¯))i
h® _ ¯;(max(NT(®);NT(¯));min(NF(®);NF(¯)))i
They deﬁne four values in an ordinal way:
t(®) =min(NT(®);1 ¡ NF(®)) (28)
k(®) =min(NT(®);NF(®)) (29)
u(®) =min(1 ¡ NT(®);1 ¡ NF(®)) (30)
f(®) =min(1 ¡ NT(®);NF(®)) (31)
The use of purely ordinal deﬁnition for the four values has some advantages,
especially in the case when only ordinal data are needed, but presents some draw-
backs. Some of the properties that we think interesting for decision aiding purposes
are not satisﬁed:
² the four values deﬁned as in equations 28-31 do not provide a fuzzy partition
of the domain:
9®; t(®) + k(®) + u(®) + f(®) 6= 1
16² contradictory and unknown cases are not exclusive:
9®; k(®) > 0 and u(®) > 0
Supposing that unknown case represents a lack of information and contra-
dictory case an excess of information, it is difﬁcult to interpret a case where
the unknown and contradictory values are both different from zero.
² it is not possible to rebuild the value of NT or NF from four values, for
example:
NT(®) 6= t(®) + k(®)
NF(®) 6= f(®) + k(®)
2.3.3 Nature of B(®)
What do B(®) (and B(:®)) intuitively represent? First of all they can be seen
as membership functions. Since for any sentence ® we consider that there exist
two extensions, the positive and the negative one, we can imagine that to any such
sentence it is possible to associate two fuzzy sets, one representing its membership
to the positive examples and the other representing its membership to the negative
examples.
We can see these two membership functions as the fuzzy counterpart of the
¢(®) (respectively ¢(:®)) in DDT logic. These formula represent the presence
of truth in sentence ® (respectively :®). In other terms these formula can be con-
sidered as the positive (negative) reasons for which ® holds.
To some extend B(®) and B(:®) try to “measure” how strong are such posi-
tive and negative reasons. Intuitively B(®) = 0 should be interpreted as “there are
no positive reasons at all”, while B(:®) = 1 should be understood as “negative
reasons are the strongest possible”. The reasons, for which the strength of positive
and negative reasons can be continuous, are twofold:
- either because of the quality of the available information (reliability of our infor-
mation sources, quantity of information, presence and dimension of measurement
errors, etc.);
- or because of the use of ill-deﬁned concepts (through linguistic variables) such as
“young”, “heavy”, etc. [the reader can see more in this issue in 17].
A general approach could be to consider them as capacities. One can deﬁne a
capacity on a set ­ as follows [11, 25]:
Deﬁnition 2.3 (Capacity)
Suppose that À : 2­ ¡! R+ is a set function, then À is a capacity if and only if the
following conditions are satisﬁed (A;B µ ­):
171. À(;) = 0 (boundary condition), and
2. if A µ B then À(A) · À(B) (monotonicity condition)
In addition, if À(­) = 1 then the capacity is normalised.
Let us remark that probabilities are normalised capacities with additive con-
junction. If B(®) is seen as the probability P(®), we will have B(®) + B(:®) =
P(®) + P(:®) = 1 and therefore:
t(®) =P(®) k(®) =0
u(®) =0 f(®) =1 ¡ P(®)
It is easy to note that interpreting B(®) as a probability, although possible
in principle, contradicts the hypothesis that positive and negative reasons are not
complementary and commensurable. Therefore normally it should not be the case
that we can write something like B(®) + B(:®) = 1. An alternative could be to
consider B(®) as a necessity measure, since this type of capacity does not imposes
complementarity with the negation.
3 B(®) as a standard necessity
In this section we ﬁrst brieﬂy recall some deﬁnitions of possibility theory which
will be useful for the rest of the paper (the reader can see more details in [16]). Pos-
sibility measures are expected to provide an ordinal representation of uncertainty
as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.1 Possibility Measure
Given a set of events ­, a possibility measure ¦ is a function deﬁned on the power
set 2­, (¦ : 2­ 7! [0;1]) such that:
1. ¦(;) = 0, ¦(­) = 1
2. A µ B 2 2­ ! ¦(A) · ¦(B)
3. 8A;B 2 2­, ¦(A [ B) = max(¦(A);¦(B))
The dual of the possibility measure, denoted necessity measure is deﬁned as
N(a) = 1 ¡ ¦(:a).
Deﬁnition 3.2 Necessity measure
Given a set of events ­, a necessity measure N is a function deﬁned on the power
set 2­, (N : 2­ 7! [0;1]), such that:
1. N(;) = 0, N(­) = 1,
2. A µ B 2 2­ ! N(A) · N(B)
3. 8A;B 2 2­, N(A \ B) = min(N(A);N(B))
18Let’s remark that the disjunction of the necessity measure and the conjunction
of the possibility measure are not compositional:
N(® _ ¯) ¸ max(N(®);N(¯))
¦(® ^ ¯) · min(¦(®);¦(¯)) (32)
As a result, we obtain the following properties:
¦(®) ¸ N(®)
max(¦(®);¦(:®)) = 1 (33)
If N(®) 6= 0; then ¦(®) = 1
If ¦(®) 6= 1; then N(®) = 0 (34)
By deﬁnition we can consider a possibility measure as the upper bound of the
uncertainty associated to an event (or a sentence), the one carrying the less speciﬁc
information. Dually the necessity measure will represent the lower bound: how
sure we are about an event (or a sentence). Clearly three extreme situations are
possible:
- N(®) = 1;N(:®) = 0, ® is the case;
- N(®) = 0;N(:®) = 1, :® is the case;
- N(®) = 0;N(:®) = 0, nothing is sure and everything is possible.
A ﬁrst attempt to interpret the continuous valuation of “presence of truth in ®”
and “presence of truth in :®” could be to consider them as necessity measures.
Coming back to our notation, we consider B(®), as a standard necessity; as a
consequence we have:
B(®) = N(®) = 1 ¡ ¦(:®) ;
B(:®) = N(:®) = 1 ¡ ¦(®)
Hence, we obtain the following deﬁnitions:
t(®) =min(N(®);¦(®)) (35)
k(®) =max(N(®) ¡ ¦(®);0) (36)
u(®) =max(¦(®) ¡ N(®);0) (37)
f(®) =min(¦(:®);N(:®)) (38)
19However, since ¦(®) > N(®) we can reformulate the equations 35-38:
t(®) =N(®)
k(®) =0
u(®) =¦(®) ¡ N(®)
f(®) =N(:®) = 1 ¡ ¦(®)
We ﬁrst observe that interpreting B(®) as a standard necessity measure leads to
k(®) = 0. This is not surprising given the semantics of necessity.
Let us study separately the two situations, N(®) > 0 and N(®) = 0:
When N(®) > 0, we get:
t(®) =N(®)
k(®) =f(®) = 0
u(®) =¦(:®)
When N(®) = 0, we get:
t(®) =k(®) = 0
u(®) =¦(®)
f(®) =N(:®)
In other terms it appears that, while the necessity measure represents the “true-
ness” of a sentence (or, exclusively, of its negation), the possibility measure repre-
sents the “unknownness” of the same sentence.
There are two different ways to deﬁne the usual logical operators. In order to
present them we give an example. We consider here the case of conjunction for
which there exist two different ways of deﬁnition. Each way is denoted by index i,
i = 1;2. Unfortunately the results in the two cases are different:
² The ﬁrst one consists in using directly the deﬁnition of conjunction of our
continuous extension given in equation 26:
h® ^1 ¯;(min(B(®);B(¯));max(B(:®);B(:¯)))i =
h® ^1 ¯;(min(N(®);N(¯));max(N(:®);N(:¯)))i =
h® ^1 ¯;(min(N(®);N(¯));max(1 ¡ ¦(®);1 ¡ ¦(¯)))i =
h® ^1 ¯;(min(N(®);N(¯));1 ¡ min(¦(®);¦(¯)))i
² The second one consists in using the deﬁnition of conjunction and disjunc-
tion of possibility theory presented in deﬁnition 3.2 and in equation 32:
h® ^2 ¯;(B(® ^ ¯);B(:(® ^ ¯)))i =
h® ^2 ¯;(N(® ^ ¯);N(:(® ^ ¯)))i =
h® ^2 ¯;(N(® ^ ¯);1 ¡ ¦(® ^ ¯))i =
h® ^2 ¯;(min(N(®);N(¯)));1 ¡ ¦(® ^ ¯))i
20It is easy to check that these two deﬁnitions are not equivalent. Negative
reasons of the second deﬁnition are greater than the ﬁrst one’s. ¦(® ^ ¯) ·
min(¦(®);¦(¯)).
Similarresultsmaybeobtainedforotheroperatorslikedisjunction, implication
and equivalence. Although this approach is consistent with possibility theory, it has
some weak points:
- presence of truth and “trueness” are practically equivalent;
- there is no way to consider contradictory statements;
- there are several compositional problems.
4 B(®) as a sub-normalised necessity measure
An important feature of four-valued logics is the separation of negation from com-
plementation. Possibility theory does not make any difference between these two
operators since it has been conceived as an uncertainty measure to be associated to
classic logic. In this section, we suggest the idea of associating an uncertainty mea-
sure to a formalism such as DDT and study the consequences. In order to do that
we recall the use of the “weak negation” 6» (to be read as “perhaps”) of DDT logic
(see subsection 2.1). We remind that such a weak negation is conceived so that the
complement of a sentence “» ®” can be established as “: 6» : 6» ®”. Finally we
remind that for each sentence ® we have the distribution h®;B(®);B(:®)i.
We denote the dual measure of B as H (H(®) = 1 ¡ B(:®)) so that for each
sentence ® we have the new distribution h®;H(®);H(:®)i. From equation 9 and
recalling that B(:®) = f(®) + k(®) we get that:
H(®) = t(®) + u(®)
Proposition 4.1 Consider two dual uncertainty distributions on a set­: B(x) and
H(x), applied on the language DDT, such that equations 9-16 are satisﬁed. Then
8x 2 ­ B(x) = H(: » x).
Proof. Recall that H(®) = t(®) + u(®).
From equations 10-13 and the deﬁnitions of the DDT logic we have:
- t(®) = f(» ®) = f(: 6» : 6» ®) = t(6» : 6» ®) = t(: » ®);
- u(®) = k(» ®) = k(: 6» : 6» ®) = k(6» : 6» ®) = k(: » ®);
Therefore, H(®) = t(: » ®) + k(: » ®).
21In other terms the dual measure of B is equal to the measure of the negation of
the complement. It is easy to extend the result of proposition 4.1 to all formula as
results in table 5.
B(®) =B( ®) =H( :  ®) =H( :®)
B(:®) =B( :®) =H(:  :  ®) =H( ®)
B(:  :  ®) =B(:  :®) =H(:®) =H(:  ®)
B( :  ®) =B(:  ®) =H(®) =H(:  :®)
Table 5: Equivalence between B and H
Table 5 shows that the introduction of the weak negation reduces the dual mea-
sures of the type necessity/possibility to a single one. Indeed we just need to know
one of the uncertainty measures of a sentence and of its negation in order to know
all about the uncertainty associated to this sentence. Let us remark that in standard
possibility theory, there is only an ordinal relation between necessity and possibil-
ity (8®; ¦(®) ¸ N(®)) which does not permit to rebuild one in terms of the other
one.
Further on, let us consider the ﬁrst column of table 5. If we consider that
only one uncertainty distribution is deﬁned (say B) there is no reason to claim
that B(: » ®) = B( :  ®) > B(®) (the uncertainty associated to the
complement of the negation of a sentence is not necessarily larger than the un-
certainty associated to the sentence itself; they should be unrelated). However,
since B( :  ®) = H(®), if the relation H(®) > B(®) does not hold we
are practically relaxing the normalisation principle of uncertainty measures used in
possibility theory (¦(®)  N(®)). Approaches which make use of such relaxation
of possibility measures exist in the literature and in such cases the necessity degree
is generally called sub-normalised in order to differentiate them for classical possi-
bility measures which are normalised in the interval [0;1]. [9]. What we see is that,
while it is difﬁcult to justify such distributions in a pure possibility theory frame,
the use of the DDT logic allows to give a logical justiﬁcation for their existence.
Moreover, the use of this sub-normalised uncertainty distribution has as a con-
sequence that:
B(® _ ¯) =
B(» (» ® ^ » ¯)) =
1 ¡ B(» ® ^ » ¯) =
1 ¡ min(B(» ®);B(» ¯)) =
max(1 ¡ B(» ®);1 ¡ B(» ¯)) =
max(B(®);B(¯)).
22This does not solve all compositional problems of the language, but allows a wider
ﬁeld of interesting computational results.
Last, but not least, recall once more that in our language we associate to each
sentence ® the distribution: h®;B(®);B(:®)i. We can interpret B(®) and B(:®)
as two functions on the power set of a set of events ­. We establish the following
deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.1 A DDT distribution on the set of events ­ is a couple of functions
f1 : 2­ 7! [0;1], f2 : 2­ 7! [0;1] such that:
- 8A µ ­ we have hA;f1(A);f2(A)i;
- f1(;) = f2(;) = 0;
- f1(­) = f2(­) = 1;
- A µ B ) f1(A) · f1(B);
- C µ D ) f2(C) · f2(D);
- for A \ B we have hA \ B;min(f1(A);f1(B));max(f2(A);f2(B))i;
- for A [ B we have hA [ B;max(f1(A);f1(B));min(f2(A);f2(B))i.
It has already been noted that uncertainty measures can be seen as capacity
measures. The use of a double instead of a single function allows to consider
the possibility to compare this type of distribution with the case of two capacity
measures. Such measures, deﬁning two independent, monotone capacities have
recently been introduced in the literature by [26] and are called bi-capacities:
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Bi-capacity)
Let us denote P(J) = f(C;D) : C µ J;D µ J;C \ D = ;g, then
À : P(J) ¡! [0;1] £ [0;1] is a bi-capacity function if it satisﬁes the following
conditions:
1. À(;;;) = 0, and
2. if C ¶ E and D µ F then À(C;D) ¸ À(E;F).
This deﬁnition suggests that two subsets of J have an empty intersection which
is not always the case with positive and negative reasons. For this reason, we make
use of a more recent deﬁnition given by [20] where the exclusivity condition on
the sets C and D is not necessary. They called such measures generalised bi-
capacities:
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Generalised bi-capacity)
Let us denote P¤(J) = f(C;D) : C µ J;D µ Jg, then
À : P(J) ¡! [0;1] £ [0;1] is a generalised bi-capacity function if it satisﬁes the
following conditions
1. À¤(C;;) = (c;0), and À(;;D) = (0;d), with c;d 2 [0;1]
232. À¤(J;;) = (1;0), and À(;;J) = (0;1)
3. Suppose that À¤(C;D) = (c;d) and À¤(E;F) = (e;f) with c;d;e;f 2
[0;1]; if C ¶ E and D µ F then, c ¸ e and d · f
Given (C;D) 2 P¤(J) with À¤(C;D) = (c;d), they deﬁne two new relations
À¤+ and À¤¡: À¤+(c;d) = c and À¤¡(c;d) = d.
Proposition 4.2 A DDT uncertainty distribution is a generalised bi-capacity mea-
sure.
Proof.:
Let’s consider P¤(J) = f(C;D) : C µ J;D µ Jg and À¤+(c;d) = B(®) =
f1(®) and À¤¡(c;d) = B(:®) = f2(®), then À ¤ (C;D) = (f1(®);f2(®)). We
have
1. À¤(C;;) = (c;0), and À¤(;;D) = (0;d), with c;d 2 [0;1], from deﬁnition
4.3.
2. À¤(J;;) = (1;0), and À¤(;;J) = (0;1), from deﬁnition 4.3.
3. Suppose that À¤(C;D) = (f1(®);f2(®)) and À¤(E;F) = (f1(¯);f2(¯));
ifC ¶ E andD µ F then, fromdeﬁnition4.3, f1(®) ¸ f1(¯)andf2(®) · f2(¯).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we discuss two distinct tools used to deal with uncertainty: four val-
ued logics and uncertainty distributions; both extensively used in decision aiding,
the ﬁrst one in order to take into account positive and negative reasons in formu-
lating a recommendation, the second one in order to take into account the poor or
contradictory information present in the decision aiding process.
We ﬁrst show how it is possible to extend a four valued logic using continu-
ous valuations of positive and negative reasons. We then interpret such continuous
valuations as standard necessity measures. On the one hand we obtain a result con-
sistent with possibility theory, but on the other hand we lose some of the expressive
power of the four valued logic, mainly the possibility to distinguish contradictory
statements from unknown ones. We then show that by interpreting such valuations
as sub-normalised necessity measures, we are able to fully exploit the expressivity
of the four valued language, but at the price of losing the possibility to use two
independent dual measures of uncertainty.
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28Appendix A
Proof of proposition 2.2
Before giving the proof of the proposition, we remind in the following the
deﬁnition of a Lukasiewicz triple:
LNÁ(x) = Á¡1(1 ¡ Á(x))
LTÁ(x;y) = Á¡1(max(Á(x) + Á(y) ¡ 1;0))
LVÁ(x;y) = Á¡1(min(Á(x) + Á(y);1))
where Á is an automorphism of [0, 1].
The proof will be done in two steps:
i. First of all, we will suppose that
N = LNÁ, T2 = T3 = LTÁ
V = LVÁ T1 = T4 = min
and try to prove that equations 9-16 are satisﬁed.
Let’s begin with the deﬁnitions of four fuzzy values:
t(®) =min(B(®);1 ¡ B(:®)) (39)
k(®) =Á¡1 max(Á(B(®)) + Á(B(:®)) ¡ 1;0) (40)
u(®) =Á¡1 max(1 ¡ Á(B(®)) ¡ Á(B(:®));0) (41)
f(®) =min(1 ¡ B(®);B(:®)) (42)
in this case,
if Á(B(®)) + Á(B(:®)) ¸ 0 thus,
Á(B(®)) ¸ 1 ¡ Á(B(:®)),
or Á is an automorphism of [0, 1], then
B(®) ¸ 1 ¡ B(:®), and B(:®) ¸ 1 ¡ B(®),
as a conclusion
k(®) = Á¡1(Á(B(®)) + Á(B(:®)) ¡ 1) and we get
t(®) = 1¡B(:®); k(®) = B(®)+B(:®)¡1; u(®) = 0;f(®) = 1¡B(®)
It is easy to check that equations 9-16 are satisﬁed.
if Á(B(®)) + Á(B(:®)) · 0, then Á(B(®)) · 1 ¡ Á(B(:®)),
thus
29B(®) · 1 ¡ B(:®), and B(:®) · 1 ¡ B(®),
as a conclusion
u(®) = Á¡1(1 ¡ (Á(B(®)) + Á(B(:®)))) and we get
t(®) = B(®); u(®) = 1 ¡ (B(®) + B(:®)); k(®) = 0; f(®) = B(:®);
It is easy to check that equations 9-16 are satisﬁed.
As a consequence, if N = LNÁ, T2 = T3 = LTÁ V = LVÁ T1 = T4 = min
then equations 9-16 are satisﬁed.
ii. Let’s analyse now the other direction of the equivalence:
Suppose that equations 5-16 are satisﬁed, then
i. N = LNÁ: because B(®) + N(B(®)) = 1
ii. V = LVÁ:
B(®) + N(B(®)) = 1, then V (t(®);k(®)) + V (f(®);u(®)) = 1 (eq. 14),
if k(®) = 0, then
V (t(®);0) + V (f(®);u(®)) = 1
t(®) + V (f(®);u(®)) = 1 (t-conorm property),
then
V (f(®);u(®)) = f(®) + u(®) (eq. 9)
iii. T1 = T4 = min: from equations 5-8 and 14-15, we get:
t(®) =T1(V (t(®);k(®));V (t(®);u(®)))
k(®) =T2(V (t(®);k(®));V (f(®);k(®)))
u(®) =T3(V (f(®);u(®));V (t(®);u(®)))
f(®) =T4(V (f(®);u(®));V (f(®);k(®)))
if k(®) = 0 then
t(®) = T1(t(®);V (t(®);u(®)))
V (t(®);u(®)) ¸ t(®), then
T1 is the upper bound of t-norms, ie. T1 = min
f(®) = T4(V (f(®);u(®));f(®))
V (f(®);u(®)) ¸ f(®), then
T4 is the upper bound of t-norms, ie. T4 = min
30iv. T2 = T3 = LTÁ
if k(®) = 0 then
u(®) = T3(N(V (t(®);k(®)));N(V (f(®);k(®))))
u(®) = T3(N(V (t(®);0));N(V (f(®);0)))
u(®) = T3(N(t(®));N(f(®)))
u(®) = T3(1 ¡ t(®);1 ¡ f(®)), and u(®) = 1 ¡ t(®) ¡ f(®)
thus,
T3(1 ¡ t(®);1 ¡ f(®)) = 1 ¡ t(®) ¡ f(®),
then, T3 is continuous, Archimedean and has a zero divisor, ie. it is nilpotent.
An element x 2]0;1[ is called a zero divisor of a t-norm T if and only if (9y 2
]0;1[ T(x;y) = 0). A t-norm without zero divisors is called positive.
A continuous t-norm T is Archimedean if and only if 8x 2]0;1[ T(x;x) < x.
Let’s prove that T3 is Archimedean:
Suppose that T3 is not Archimedean, then
8®; t(®) = f(®); T3(1 ¡ t(®);1 ¡ f(®)) = 1 ¡ t(®), or
T3(1 ¡ t(®);1 ¡ f(®)) = u(®) = 1 ¡ t(®) ¡ f(®),
as a conclusion, T3 is Archimedean.
Let’s prove that T3 has a zero divisor:
Suppose that T3 does not have a zero divisor, then
8x;y 2]0;1[ T(x;y) 6= 0, or
there exist cases where t(®) 6= 1; f(®) 6= 1; u(®) 6= o, thus
9®; t(®);f(®) 2]0;1[ T3(1 ¡ t(®);1 ¡ f(®)) = 0),
as a conclusion, T3 has a zero divisor
Moreover, it is known that a nilpotent t-norm is Á-transform of the Lukasiewicz
t-norm, as a conclusion T3 = LTÁ.
The proof of T2 = LTÁ is similar to the last one where the condition k(®) = 0
is replaced by u(®) = 0
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